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Abstract 
In this work, a descriptive analysis is exposed, both at a theoretical and practical 
level, regarding the relationship that exists between Solvency and Profitability of 
Spanish deposit institutions, especially banks. The analysis is structured in two clearly 
differentiated parts. On the one hand, in the first part of the theoretical content, a review 
is made of the different regulations on banking prudential matters and the different 
causes that make the profitability of the banking sector do not recover to the levels prior 
to the 2008 financial crisis. On the other hand, in the second part of practical content, a 
multivariate statistical model known as the “Structural Equation Model” is implemented 
in order to see the relationship between solvency regulation and the profitability of 
entities. As a result, we can observe as a regression how all the new banking regulation, 
whose objective is to guarantee solvency, has contributed to improving profitability in 
recent years, but has not been able to return it to levels prior to 2008. 
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1. Introduction. 
1.1. Presentation of the topic. 
In August 2007, the bankruptcy of several smaller American investment banks was a 
prelude to the global economic crisis, called by many experts as the "crisis of developed 
countries", which began in 2008 after the fall of the Lehman Brothers  bank, 1
highlighting the existing failures in economic regulation that caused a credit-mortgage 
and confidence crisis in the different international financial markets. 
The capital levels of the banking system were not sufficient or of the necessary quality, 
and there was excessive leverage in many countries. Additionally, the liquidity problems 
suffered by credit institutions made it impossible to refinance them in the short term. 
Consequently, the deleveraging process carried out to face this lack of liquidity, together 
with the great dependency that existed between the different entities, led to a situation 
of instability in the financial system and, therefore, in a situation of instability of the 
economy in general. 
The response that was carried out to face this problem consisted of a strengthening of 
the rules and regulations of banking supervision as well as the establishment of 
guidelines for the correct management of the different risks to which the entities were 
exposed. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)  designed the Basel III  2 3
agreement as a set of very broad regulations and reforms aimed at solving the financial 
crisis and improving economic and financial relations in the different countries. 
Therefore, it is necessary an analysis that allows to relate the different solvency 
obligations imposed on the banking sector by the European Central Bank and the new 
regulatory laws of these entities with the evolution of their profitability to be able to 
study if this increase that It has been produced in the protection of solvency has affected 
profitability and, therefore, the future of their business. 
1.2. Objectives. 
There is no doubt that the role played by financial institutions and, especially, banks 
is essential for the economy of any country. These entities grant credits so that both 
families and companies can finance their economic activity. In view of this, the present 
work proposes to present and analyze information related to the stability of the Spanish 
banking sector as well as information related to its profitability from 2007 to 2019. 
 American investment bank founded in 1850 and dissolved in 2008 as a result of high exposure to risks related to 1
subprime mortgages. His bankruptcy is blamed for the start of the 2008 financial crisis.
 Entity that guides on financial regulation. It issues recommendations, such as the different Basel agreements, that it is 2
not mandatory to abide by them.
 Agreement whose main objective is to improve the situation of the banking sector by strengthening its regulation, 3
supervision and risk management. These guidelines were published in late 2010.
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There is a clear limitation as it is not intended nor can it be thoroughly reviewed all the 
existing regulations, nor is it the task of this work to carry out an exhaustive patrimonial 
analysis since to validate the hypothesis that we set out in the methodology of this work. 
The present work focuses on three main general objectives. The first of these is to 
review, broadly speaking, the current banking regulations divided in turn into two 
specific objectives that seek to study the evolution of this regulation throughout the 
study period and review the evolution of the Basel Agreements. The second general 
objective is to expose in a concise and illustrative way the performance that the Spanish 
banking system has been taking in the face of the past profitability crisis. Finally, and as 
a more important objective, the relationship between the different capital requirements 
that have been imposed and profitability is analyzed, to try to draw conclusions on 
whether all these measures have benefited or have harmed the banking business. This 
relationship will become apparent after the application of a statistical model widely used 
in Economic Science, called "Structural Equations"  (SEM). 4
These objectives are intended to be achieved by studying the rules and the different 
regulations on banking supervision. The approach of the International Bank of 
Payments  (IBP) and the European Central Bank will be used in accordance with the 5
regulations established by the European Committee of Banking Supervisors  (ECBS). 6
1.3. State of the question. 
The speed and scope of the economic and financial crisis of 2008, the key role that 
the banking system played and has in the intermediation process in the economy and the 
character of banks' systemic interest entities made it necessary to take measures to 
strengthen the resistance of the financial sector, especially the banking sector, to avoid 
further contagion to the real economy. 
The Basel Committee, which is in charge of international supervision regulation, was in 
charge of reinforcing the banking sector by establishing a series of reforms aimed at 
improving the liquidity and solvency statements of financial institutions. All of these 
reforms focused on strengthening entities' global capital as well as establishing 
previously agreed international liquidity standards. 
Focusing on Spain, the situation was a little different from the rest of the European 
economies. At the beginning of this crisis Spain was in an advantageous situation since 
its economy was not flooded with toxic assets , a very efficient financing model for 7
families and small companies was used, there was a very strict solvency regulation and 
 Multivariate technique used in Statistics to test and estimate relationships from data and qualitative assumptions 4
between variables.
 International financial entity whose objective is to promote international cooperation between central banks to 5
guarantee monetary and financial stability.
 Entity that links the Commission and the NCAs, and ensures that the Community measures are applied uniformly.6
 Risky assets with a very bad or subprime rating.7
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an immense network of commercial bank offices that allowed raising large amounts of 
funds. As the years after the outbreak of the crisis progressed, the Spanish banking 
sector began to be affected as a consequence of the large imbalances in the real estate 
market, increasing the number of defaults and reducing the demand for financing. 
The Spanish authorities acted establishing measures focused on guaranteeing bank 
liquidity and aimed at solving the different imbalances and structural problems suffered 
by the banking sector. We can summarize the most important ones as: 
• October 2008: The coverage of the deposit guarantee was increased and the 
Fondo de Adquisición de Activos Financieros  was created, which was intended to 8
increase the liquidity of financial institutions. 
• The Spanish State granted guarantees to the new bank issues. For this, a series 
of characteristics had to be fulfilled and where the maturity of the issue had to be 
a maximum of five years. 
• June 2009: The Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria  (FROB) was 9
created to facilitate the integration of viable financial entities. Thus, solvency was 
improved. 
• Year 2012: The high amount of capital necessary to guarantee bank solvency 
made Spain request help from the European Union. In July 2012, the 
Memorandum of Understanding  (MoU) was signed where a roadmap was 10
created for the banking sector to be restructured. 
• The Sociedad de Gestión de Activos procedentes de la Reestructuración 
Bancaria  (SAREB) was created. This partnership helped entities reduce toxic 11
portfolio assets. 
 According to López Domínguez, Ignacio in Expansión Daily Economic Dictionary: “Fund created in order to support 8
the supply of credit to the productive activity of companies and individuals. It is administered, managed and directed 
by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, it has an initial contribution of 30,000 million euros, expandable up to 50,000 
million euros”.
 Organization created in 2008 that is responsible for the resolution of credit institutions and investment services 9
companies. Its main purpose is to restructure the financial system and try to strengthen its own resources after a 
merger of entities. Created by the RD-Ley 9/2009, de 26 de junio, sobre reestructuración bancaria y reforzamiento de 
los recursos propios de las entidades de crédito.
 Document signed by at least two entities, declaring the will to act with a shared objective, without legally binding any 10
of the participants.
 Asset management company established through financial institutions nationalized in Spain and by entities that are 11
in the process of resolution or restructuring. The participation of this company is divided into 45% of public capital and 
55% of private capital.
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1.4. Data. 
The data to be used in this work, especially for the fourth chapter where the 
statistical model is used, have been obtained mainly from statistical sources and 
financial stability reports provided by the European Central Bank and the Banco de 
España. The data used correspond to those ratios that are of interest such as 
profitability, solvency, leverage or indebtedness. Data extracted corresponding to the 
period 2007-2019, that is a 13-year period. 
This type of data serves as the basis for the construction of the database to be used in 
the proposed statistical model. 
1.5. Methodology. 
The methodology pursued consists of a mixed type of research. The first part of this 
work consists of a qualitative investigation where a series of bibliography is reviewed 
with the aim of contextualizing the subject matter as well as trying to shed light on 
relevant theoretical aspects. 
The bibliography on which this work has been supported is very wide and varied. There 
are a large number of resources on the web as well as countless works and articles 
related to the subject in which we deal here. We highlight a series of authors with whom 
without their contribution this work would not have been possible: 
• Guajardo (2002), argues that the indicators related to profitability try to 
evaluate the amount of profit obtained with respect to the investment made, being 
able to take into account both the capital for accounting purposes and the 
company's assets as a whole. Therefore, profitability analysis is essential for the 
survival and sustainability of a company. 
• Mc Callum (2009), the ability of a bank to create value is mainly based on 
three aspects: the entity's profit, the raising of funds in the form of a deposit and 
capitalization. 
• Valverde and Fernández (2007), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Brock 
and Suárez (2000), Demirgüç-kunt and Levine (2003) and Goddard et al. (2004), 
banks with higher capital levels are more profitable and efficient than those with a 
lower capital level since there is a relationship between profitability and the 
financial structure. 
• Kosmidou (2008), the greater own capital in relation to assets, less dependence 
on external financing and consequently higher profitability. 
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• Terraza (2015), analyzes 1270 European banking entities in the period 
2005-2013, detecting that liquidity risk depends on the size of the entity and that a 
higher capitalization increases profitability. 
In the second part, the research carried out is specifically quantitative, where the 
analysis of the databases provided by the European Central Bank and the Banco de 
España of the different Spanish Credit institutions serve as the basis for the elaboration 
of the statistical model used. This model is intended to validate the hypothesis in which 
we assume that the banking regulation imposed in terms of solvency has benefited 
banks by increasing their profitability and guaranteeing their future business. 
1.6. Structure of work. 
The elaboration of this work has been developed in a series of chapters detailed 
below as follow. 
In the second chapter, the different banking regulations that are currently in force are 
exposed, as well as the evolution that the regulations have had from 2007 to 2019 and 
the different Basel agreements that have been adopted. In the third chapter, the 
profitability crisis experienced by banks since the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis 
and the different actions that entities have carried out to face the profitability decline are 
highlighted. In the fourth and last chapter, a practical application is made using the 
statistical model “Structural equations” (SEM) using as data those set forth in the 
previous section 1.4 to try to analyze and see numerically the relationship that has had 
the different regulations on solvency with the profitability of banks. 
2. The new European banking regulation. 
2.1. Bank supervision. 
Banking supervision is the essential activity in order to control that a responsible 
operation is carried out to carry entities in the market, dictating the appropriate capital 
and reserve levels so that future risky situations can be faced. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision indicates a set of recommendations and principles for correct 
supervisory and regulatory activity in the banking sector. 
These principles were last revised in October 2011 to try to adjust to market 
developments and new changes. The main adaptation was the proposal to weigh the 
relative importance of each bank, in relation to its risk and importance to the system. 
The current supervisory system is understood through what is called, on the one hand, 
microprudential supervision and, on the other hand, macroprudential supervision. These 
are key concepts within the banking supervisory activity. 
5
2.1.1. Macroprudential supervision. 
Focused on European banks, macroprudential supervision is carried out by a number 
of institutions in the European Union and its main objective is to reduce systematic risk 
as much as possible. 
One of the institutions dedicated to this type of supervision is the so-called European 
Financial Supervision System  (EFSS), created as a group of independent institutions 12
based on the Larosiére Report  for 2009. A notable feature of this institution is that it 13
achieves a very effective supervision acting in a decentralized way thanks to the 
collaboration of all the members of the same achievement, thus a constant and reliable 
flow of information. Among these members we can highlight the European Systemic 
Risk Board  (ESRB) whose main objective is to contribute to the financial stability of 14
the European Union, trying to minimize the systematic risk of banking entities. To do 
this, its supervision is based on a macroeconomic analysis of the different market 
factors. 
Another institution that carries out macroprudential supervision is the so-called 
European System of Central Banks  (ESCB) and supports the ESRB. This is made up 15
of the European Central Bank and all the Central Banks of the different countries that 
make up the European Union. 
Finally, there is another institution called the European Banking Authority (EBA) that 
aims to control that good supervision and operation of the European financial sector is 
carried out. To do this, it implements supervision techniques and improves existing 
techniques to try to achieve harmonization of the internal market. The EBA is key in the 
protection and security of the different investors since it establishes balanced conditions 
in the competition. 
2.1.2. Microprudential supervision. 
Individualizing the supervision according to the geographical area, national or 
european, and the sectorial area of the entities (banks, insurance and securities markets) 
we have what is known as microprudential supervision. 
The national supervisors are in charge of controlling all the financial entities existing in 
each country, with the central task of ensuring compliance with the minimum 
mandatory requirements to carry out their activity. These requirements are the level of 
reserves, identification and quantification of its risks, level of capital, level of solvency, 
 Framework for financial supervision in EU since 2011.12
 Published on February 25, 2009, it arises as a consequence of a commission from the European Commission to a 13
high-level group of experts for which they should analyze the regulatory and supervisory framework existing in the 
European Union, establishing specific recommendations for its improvement.
 It contributes to prevent or mitigate systemic risk to promote stability in the EU.14
 It is the union of ECB and the national central banks of all members of the EU.15
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among others. However, EBA also has competences in the field of microprudential 
supervision, checking that national supervisors respect and apply European Community 
regulations. 
2.2. Spanish and European organizations with functions in banking supervision. 
2.2.1. Banco de España (BdE). 
The Banco de España exercises the functions of a central bank in our country. It is an 
entity with its own legal personality under public law and independent from the 
executive branch, member of the Eurosystem  and the European System of Central 16
Banks (ESCB). It has functions as central bank and as a member of the ESCB. 
Functions as central bank: 
• It supervises that the regulations regarding financial and credit entities are 
complied with. 
• Monitors solvency. 
• Through its actions, it seeks the stability of the financial system and its proper 
functioning. 
• It safeguards and manages the reserves of foreign exchange, precious metals and 
other assets not assigned to the European Central Bank. 
• It prepares and publishes information on its functions and shares this information 
with the ECB. 
• It acts as a financial agent in the acquisition of Public Debt and advises the 
Government of the nation. 
Functions as a member of the ESCB: 
• It collaborates in the design and execution of the monetary policy of the euro 
zone in order to achieve price stability. 
• It carries out currency exchange operations, promotes a good payment system 
and issues legal tender currency and banknotes. 
 Entity composed of the ECB and the countries belonging to the EU whose common currency is the Euro.16
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2.2.2. Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). 
The inspection and supervision of the securities markets in Spain and of the activity 
of those who intervene in them is carried out by the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de 
Valores. This entity was created in 1988 after the publication of the Ley 24/1998, de 28 
de julio, del Mercado de Valores. This Law completely reformed the Spanish financial 
system. 
The objective of this organization is to make the stock markets in Spain transparent and 
that price formation occurs correctly. In addition, another of its objectives is to protect 
all investors by having a large amount of information within their official public 
records. 
Its activity is carried out above all on the different companies that issue securities to be 
sold publicly, on secondary securities markets and on investment services entities and 
collective investment institutions, exercising prudential supervision, thus guaranteeing 
security in operations and solvency. 
2.2.3. Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones (DGSFP). 
This is a regulatory and executive entity that reports directly to the Secretaria de 
Economía y Apoyo a la empresa , attached to the Ministerio de Asuntos Económicos y 17
Transformación Digital , in accordance with the Real Decreto 139/2020, de 28 de 18
enero, por el que se establece la estructura orgánica básica de los departamentos 
ministeriales. 
This entity supervises and controls the Spanish pension fund and insurance sector, 
guaranteeing its proper functioning, protecting clients and participants in pension plans. 
2.2.4. European Central Bank (ECB). 
The European Central Bank is, together with the different central banks of each 
member state, a body responsible for the prudential supervision of European credit 
institutions. This is part of the Eurosystem and its main objective is to keep prices stable 
to ensure the value of the common currency. Thus, it brings security and solidity to the 
banking system and stability to the European financial system and in each member 
country. 
 Secretary of State Ana de la Cueva (Madrid, España, 1966), currently in office since June 19, 2018.17
 Minister Nadia María Calviño Santamaría (La Coruña, España, 1968), currently in office since January 13, 2020.18
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2.2.5. European Banking Authority (EBA). 
At the level of the European Union, we find the European Banking Authority as an 
independent entity whose mission is to ensure a consistent and effective level of 
regulation and prudential supervision within the European banking system. It aims to 
maintain the financial stability of the EU and ensure the efficiency, integrity and proper 
functioning of banking. 
This institution is a member of the European Financial Supervision System (EFSS) 
along with two other authorities that carry out supervisory tasks such as the European 
Securities and Markets Authority  (ESMA) and the European Insurance and 19
Retirement Pensions Authority  (EIOPA). This system can also be extended to the 20
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), to the Joint Committee of European 
Supervisory Authorities  (JCESA) and to the different national entities authorized to 21
carry out supervisory tasks. 
The role of the European Banking Authority is to promote the proper functioning of the 
European market by ensuring adequate, harmonized and efficient regulation and 
supervision. Its essential task is to establish, through binding technical guidelines and 
standards, a single regulatory code for the European banking sector. This code provides 
a series of harmonized prudential rules applicable to all EU financial institutions, 
thereby creating the ideal conditions of equity and protection for clients and investors. 
In addition, an important role is played by encouraging supervisory practices to 
converge towards harmonization in the application of prudential regulations. It also tries 
to assess risks and weaknesses in the banking sector through evaluation reports and 
stress tests. 
Other activities entrusted to this authority are: 
• Investigating deficiencies when applying European regulations by national 
authorities. 
• Making decisions in an exceptional situation, such as an emergency. 
• Mediating in cases of non-agreement between the different regulatory authorities. 
• As an independent body, he advises the European Parliament (EP), the European 
Council (EUCO) and the European Commission (EC). 
 Independent authority whose mission is to protect markets and assets, ensuring transparency, efficiency and 19
organization, as well as protecting the interests of investors.
 Supervisory authority responsible for the microprudential level in the EU. It is part of the ESFS. It replaced the former 20
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pension Supervisors (CEIOPS).
 Forum created to strengthen cooperation between EBA, EIOPA and ESMA. It is known as "three European 21
Supervisory Authorities" (ESAs).
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2.3. Applicable supervision regulation in force. 
In order to credit institutions can operate correctly, they need sufficient own 
resources to assume risks derived from their activity. These own resources are 
guaranteed thanks to the role carried out by the prudential regulation of these entities, 
contributing to the stability of the financial system. 
The current regulations in force are included in the Reglamento (EU) N.º 575/2013 del 
Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 26 de junio de 2013, sobre los requisitos 
prudenciales de las entidades de crédito y las empresas de inversión, y por el que se 
modifica el Reglamento (UE) N.º 648/2012 and in the Directiva 2013/36 / EU del 
Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 26 de junio de 2013, relativa al acceso a la 
actividad de las entidades de crédito y a la supervisión prudencial de las entidades de 
crédito y a las empresas de inversión, por la que se modifica la Directiva 2002/87/CE y 
se derogan las Directivas 2006/48/CE y 2006/49/CE, which establish the solvency 
requirements of credit institutions included in the Basel III agreement. At the same time, 
the Community regulations are transposed into the Spanish legal system through the Ley 
10/2014, de 26 de junio, de ordenación, supervisión y solvencia de entidades de crédito, 
the Circular 2/2014, de 31 de enero, del Banco de España, a las entidades de crédito, 
sobre el ejercicio de diversas opciones regulatorias contenidas en el Reglamento (UE) 
N.º  575/2013, del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 26 de junio de 2013, sobre los 
requisitos prudenciales de las entidades de crédito y las empresas de inversión, y por el 
que se modifica el Reglamento (UE) N.º 648/2012, the Real Decreto 84/2015, de 13 de 
febrero, por el que se desarrolla la Ley 10/2014, de 26 de junio, de ordenación, 
supervisión y solvencia de entidades de crédito and the Circular 2/2016, de 2 de 
febrero, del Banco de España, a las entidades de crédito, sobre supervisión y solvencia, 
que completa la adaptación del ordenamiento jurídico español a la Directiva 2013/36/
UE y al Reglamento (UE) N.º 575/2013 . 
At a European level, the binding regulatory technical standards that aim to complement 
or modify non-essential elements of a Directive or Regulation stand out, as well as the 
technical implementing rules that seek uniformity in the application of the regulations. 
Financial conglomerates have special institutional and operational characteristics and, 
therefore, are subject to additional solvency, reporting and supervisory requirements. 
The elementary regulation is found in Directiva 2011/89 / EU, del Parlamento Europeo 
y del Consejo, de 16 de noviembre de 2011, por la que se modifican las Directivas 
98/78/CE, 2002/87/CE, 2006/48/CE y 2009/138/CE en lo relativo a la supervisión 
adicional de las entidades financieras que formen parte de un conglomerado financiero 
which has been fundamentally transposed by means of the modifications that both the 
Ley 10/2014, de 26 de junio, de ordenación, supervisión y solvencia de entidades de 
crédito and the Real Decreto 84/2015, de 13 de febrero, por el que se desarrolla la Ley 
10/2014, de 26 de junio, de ordenación, supervisión y solvencia de entidades de crédito 
introduced respectively in the Ley 5/2005, de 22 de abril, de supervisión de los 
conglomerados financieros y por la que se modifican otras leyes del sector financiero 
and in the Real Decreto 1332/2005, de 11 de noviembre, por el que se desarrolla la Ley 
10
5/2005, de 22 de abril, de supervisión de los conglomerados financieros y por la que se 
modifican otras leyes del sector financiero. 
The regulations currently in force according to information provided by the Banco de 
España are as follows: 
• Ley 13/1994, de 1 de junio, de Autonomía del Banco de España. (Artículo 7.6.). 
• Ley 10/2014, de 26 de junio, de ordenación, supervisión y solvencia de entidades 
de crédito. (Títulos II y III, DA 1a, 4a, 5a, .15a, 16a, 18a y 19a, DT 4a, 5a, 7a a 9a, 
y 16a).  
• Ley 5/2005, de 22 de abril, de supervisión de los conglomerados financieros y 
por la que se modifican otras leyes del sector financiero. 
• Real Decreto 1332/2005, de 11 de noviembre, por el que se desarrolla la Ley 
5/2005, de 22 de abril, de supervisión de los conglomerados financieros y por la 
que se modifican otras leyes del sector financiero. 
• Real Decreto-ley 2/2012, de 3 de febrero, de saneamiento del sector financiero. 
• Real Decreto-ley 14/2013, de 29 de noviembre, de medidas urgentes para la 
adaptación del derecho español a la normativa de la Unión Europea en materia de 
supervisión y solvencia de entidades financieras.  
• Real Decreto 84/2015, de 13 de febrero, por el que se desarrolla la Ley 10/2014, 
de 26 de junio, de ordenación, supervisión y solvencia de entidades de crédito. 
(Títulos II y III).  
• Real Decreto-ley 22/2018, de 14 de diciembre, por el que se establecen 
herramientas macroprudenciales. (Artículo Segundo). 
• Circular 2/2014, de 31 de enero, del Banco de España, a las entidades de 
crédito, sobre el ejercicio de diversas opciones regulatorias contenidas en el 
Reglamento (UE) N.º 575/2013, del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 26 de 
junio de 2013, sobre los requisitos prudenciales de las entidades de crédito y las 
empresas de inversión, y por el que se modifica el Reglamento (UE) N.º 648/2012.  
• Circular 2/2016, de 2 de febrero, del Banco de España, a las entidades de 
crédito, sobre supervisión y solvencia, que completa la adaptación del 
ordenamiento jurídico español a la Directiva 2013/36/UE y al Reglamento (UE) N.º 
575/2013.  
• Real Decreto 102/2019, de 1 de marzo, por el que se crea la Autoridad 
Macroprudencial Consejo de Estabilidad Financiera, se establece su régimen 
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jurídico y se desarrollan determinados aspectos relativos a las herramientas 
macroprudenciales.  
2.4. Basel Agreements. 
The Basel Agreements are a series of recommendations first issued in 1974 by the 
Basel Committee. This entity is made up of the different governors of the national 
central banks of the G10 . Its main mission is to try to avoid systemic risks when a 22
state of bank panic occurs. 
The basis on which this body is based and its activity rests on the idea that when a 
financial entity goes through difficulties these problems spread to other financial 
entities, thus amplifying the damage caused. 
It should be noted that the agreements issued by this Committee do not have any kind of 
legal form, yet all the Basel documents have been approved by all supervisors and 
central bank governors of countries with developed economies. These documents 
kidnap mainly on the following topics: 
• Principles on cross-border activity and cooperation between supervisors. 
• Measures for capital adequacy. 
• Basic principles. 
• Risk management method. 
2.4.1. Basel Agreement I. 
The first agreement carried out by the Basel Committee was carried out in 1988. This 
agreement, known as the Basel I Agreement, established a limit on the issuance of 
credits granted by entities based on the capital they own. This limit indicated that the 
entity's minimum capital had to be at least 8 % of the risk-weighted assets. 
To calculate this limit, own resources were divided into two different categories: 
• Tier 1 Capital and, 
• Tier 2 Capital. 
Tier 1 Capital was fully considered as own resources, while the excess of Tier 2 Capital 
over Tier 1 Capital was not taken into account as own resources. As for investments, 
assets were weighted by risk based on of four categories: 0 %, 20 %, 50 % and 100 %. 
 Group of industrially advanced countries whose central banks cooperate to regulate international finance.22
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The capital requirement established from the beginning tried to protect entities against 
credit risk, derived from the default of loans mainly. Subsequently, an amendment 
focused on market risk, thus seeking to increase the protection of entities against 
adverse market movements. 
However, the most important recommendation was to limit the leverage of financial 
investments to 12.5 times the value of owned equity. This limitation was necessary in 
those years since, historically, banking entities obtained funds from the public and 
granted credits without taking into account the risks derived from the insolvency of 
individuals or companies. 
2.4.2. Basel Agreement II. 
The second agreement made by the Basel Committee was called the Basel II 
Agreement. This agreement was approved in 2004 based on the need to respond to the 
problems that arose in the financial markets as well as the shortcomings and gaps that 
the previous Agreement presented. 
The Basel I agreement was not able to adequately recognize the risk that each borrower 
had. Furthermore, this agreement did not take into account another series of aspects that 
could pose a risk to the business continuity of financial entities. 
Basel II proposed a set of recommendations based fundamentally on three pillars: 
Minimum capital requirements. 
The capital requirement was maintained at 8 % and the contemplation of operational 
risk was introduced. This risk takes into account the loss that occurs, directly or 
indirectly, as a result of the operation of different processes, human resources or 
systems that do not work properly, in addition to taking into account external events that 
may occur. 
It was also allowed to use internal models to individually quantify the risk of each 
borrower in order to have more information and thus proceed to correctly manage these 
risks. 
Supervision of own funds by the supervisory authority. 
Central banks are now in charge of supervising the capital level of credit institutions 
and checking the methods used to calculate these capital levels. 
The principles on which this pillar is based are as follows: 
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• First principle: Banks will have to have a process that allows them to assess 
whether their total capital is sufficient in relation to their level of risk. 
• Principle Two: Supervisory entities will need to examine internal bank strategies 
and evaluations related to capital adequacy, as well as the ability to monitor and 
ensure compliance with regulatory capital ratios. 
• Third Principle: Supervisors assume that banks will operate above the minimum 
established capital requirements and, therefore, they have the duty and the capacity 
to demand that this be so. 
• Fourth principle: Supervisors will have to intervene quickly to prevent capital 
from falling below the minimum required levels. In addition, they must request the 
imminent adoption of corrective measures if the capital fails to stay at the required 
level. 
Market discipline. 
The third pillar that completes the Basel II agreement promotes transparency by 
periodically issuing risk exposure and the solvency situation of the different credit 
institutions, as well as other types of qualitative and quantitative information essential 
for understanding the situation of the entities at all times. 
2.4.3. Basel Agreement III. 
After the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, it became clear that the legislative 
framework proposed by Basel II needed urgent modification. 
On the one hand, the banks' ability to manage their risks was underestimated. 
Furthermore, it was clear that the minimum liquidity and solvency requirements 
required were not sufficient. On the other hand, another of the failures of this stage was 
the use of more complex internal risk models by the entities, since in many cases they 
only made the work of the supervisors more difficult. 
In order to correct the weaknesses of Basel II, the Basel III agreement was carried out, 
which includes the following changes: 
• Although it maintains the minimum solvency ratio at 8 %, it has changed the 
capital weights required to meet the solvency ratio and Tier 1 and Tier 2 
components. Now the highest quality Tier 1 capital must represent at least 4.5 %, 
Tier 2 must represent at least 6 % and the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 must represent at 
least 8%. 
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• It establishes a capital conservation buffer, which means an additional capital 
increase of 2.5 % to be covered with common equity and an "anti-cyclical capital 
buffer", which is no more than an additional percentage between 0 % and 2.5 % to 
fulfill in periods of bonanza and strong growth. 
• It establishes a liquidity and leverage ratios. 
These aforementioned reforms improve the quality and quantity of the regulatory capital 
required, and also improve risk coverage. On the other hand, the new leverage ratio 
limits excessive leverage in the banking sector and limits measurement errors and 
model risk. Other macroprudential reforms to contain systemic risks caused by 
procyclicality  and by the interconnection of financial entities have been implemented, 23
as we will see later. 
2.4.3.1. Greater quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base. 
There must be good quality capital to be able to optimally support the different risk 
exposures that banks have. From the financial crisis of 2008 we learned that bank losses 
from investments in unpaid loans were offset by undistributed profits, forming part of 
ordinary capital. During these years it has also been observed how the definition of 
capital was not understood in the same way in all countries, each with its own 
jurisdiction. This allowed the market to be unable to evaluate and compare the quality 
of capital between entities. 
For this reason, a series of changes have been introduced with respect to Basel II, 
summarized below. 
• Tier 1 capital must be formed mainly by ordinary shares and undistributed 
benefits. The rest of the capital may be subordinated instruments, and innovative 
hybrid capital instruments will be progressively limited. 
• The assets of Tier 2 capital are harmonized. 
• Tier 3 capital, whose sole purpose was to cover market risks, is eliminated. 
• Finally, transparency is increased on the basis of capital. All capital elements are 
reported and accounts are provided in detail. All of this contributes to improving 
market discipline. 
All these modifications have been introduced in such a way that it does not alter too 
much the capital assets that are currently in circulation. 
 Stock, bond and credit flows that are abundant in favorable situations but become scarce when situations are 23
adverse. This causes very optimistic moments and other very pessimistic ones, with very excessive effects.
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2.4.3.2. Leverage ratio as a complement to the risk-based capital requirement. 
The excess that occurred in bank financial leverage during the 2007-2012 period led 
the sector to a situation of decline and extreme weakness that threatened the Spanish 
economy as a whole. An extreme adjustment in this sense was necessary, which caused 
the prices of financial assets to fall even more, increasing losses and decreasing the 
issuance of credit. That is why a leverage ratio is introduced whose objectives are 
basically to reduce the leverage of the banking sector to avoid damage to the real 
economy, and to carry out measures to protect against model risk  and measurement 24
errors. 
This leverage ratio is calculated in the same way in all countries even if they have 
different jurisdictions and was set for 2018 at a minimum of 3 %. For this, the different 
accounting regulations are taken into account. 
In the numerator we find Tier 1 Capital, and in the numerator the sum of Positions 
within Balance Sheet, exposures to derivatives, financing transactions with securities 
and Out of Balance Sheet items. 
2.4.3.3. Reduction of procyclicality and promotion of anticyclical buffers. 
The banking sector has been dealing with situations of financial instability for 
several years. Financial shocks are now behaving in a cyclical dynamic, thus affecting 
financial markets and the real economy. 
The Basel Committee, being aware of this, has established a series of measures in this 
last agreement in order to help improve this dynamic by absorbing shocks instead of 
transmitting all the risk that arises throughout the financial system. 
We can summarize these measures in: 
• Use of provisions of a more prospective nature. 
• Promotion of the creation of a capital conservation buffer. This fund should be 
used in times of greater financial stress. Its amount should be 2.5 % of the total 
amount of the bank's risk exposure. 
• Protection of the banking sector against moments of excessive credit growth. 
2.4.3.4. Introduction of an international liquidity standard.  
To guarantee the stability of the banking system, it is necessary, in addition to the 
minimum capital requirements, a minimum liquidity requirement. This was evident in 
 Risk that an asset has been valued using an inadequate model or an adequate model with erroneous parameters.24
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the years after 2008, when many banking entities found themselves in financial 
difficulties even when they were at adequate solvency levels. The problem was that 
their liquidity levels were not necessary, going through moments of financial stress. 
The Basel Committee has introduced two different liquidity standards with 
complementary objectives. These two standards are the Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR) and the Net Stable Financing Ratio (NSFR). We detail them below. 
Liquidity coverage ratio 
The design of this liquidity standard has been carried out to strengthen the banking 
system to face possible lack of liquidity in 30-day periods of time. In this way, the 
possession of high quality assets that are very liquid is encouraged to compensate in this 
way for the net cash outflows that may occur in times of stress. The liquidity coverage 
ratio has been gradually applied, starting at 60 % in 2015 and reaching 100 % in 2018. 
The LCR takes into account a series of situations that can lead to moments of financial 
stress. Namely: 
• Decrease in the credit quality of the entity. 
• Loss of a large proportion of deposits. 
• Loss of wholesale financing. 
• Collateral margin increase for derivative products. 
Net stable financing ratio 
This liquidity standard forces the bank to have stable sources of financing, adapting 
these sources to the liquidity profile of the assets it has and to possible contingencies 
over a period of one year. 
This is about limiting short-term wholesale financing at times when liquidity abounds in 
the financial markets. 
2.4.3.5. Leverage ratio. 
Another measure that was taken by the Basel Committee was to establish a Leverage 
Ratio as the banking sector was too leveraged. In the years of greatest incidence of the 
financial crisis, the markets pressured banks to reduce their leverage levels, which led to 
a drop in asset prices. This further aggravated the loss dynamic in which the sector 
found itself. 
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The objectives that are pursued with this measure are basically two. Firstly, the aim is to 
establish a limit to the level of bank leverage up to an optimal level that does not harm 
the rest of the financial system or the real economy. The second objective is to try to 
strengthen capital requirements with a measure that is not based on the level of risk. 
A minimum leverage ratio of 3 % of Tier 1 Capital has been applied during the parallel 
application period (2013-2017). For the year 2018 this minimum coefficient was also 
established at 3 %. 
2.5. The Banking Union (BU). 
With the intention of promoting the creation of a single banking supervisor that 
would improve the quality of supervision in the euro area and favor the integration of 
the markets, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union (EU) met in 
June 2012. However, it was not until October 15, 2013 that the initiative for the creation 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was finalized through the resolution of the 
Reglamento (UE) 1024/2013, de 15 de octubre de 2013, que encomienda al Banco 
Central Europeo tareas específicas respecto de políticas relacionadas con la 
supervisión prudencial de las entidades de crédito, in which it defines SSM as the 
European surveillance system for financial institutions, in which the supervisory 
function of the European Central Bank (ECB) is combined with the mediation of the 
competent national authorities (NCAs) of the countries of the euro area, including the 
Banco de España. And it was not until November 14, 2014 that the SSM became fully 
operational. 
Therefore, we could affirm that the creation of the SSM was the first step towards the 
creation of a "Banking Union". Although two other pillars are also essential to complete 
this process: 
• The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which became operational in 2015. 
• A Harmonized deposit guarantee system, for which a creation proposal was 
presented in November 2015 by the European Commission. 
• These three pillars of the Banking union mentioned are further reinforced by the 
creation of a single normative code, the Single Rule Book, based on the new capital 
requirements framework established by the Reglamento (UE) 575/2013, de 26 de 
junio de 2013 , sobre los requisitos prudenciales de las entidades de crédito y las 
empresas de inversión, y por el que se modifica el Reglamento (UE) N. ° 648/2012 
and by the Directiva 2013/36/UE, de 26 de junio de 2013, relativa al acceso a la 
actividad de las entidades de crédito y a la supervisión prudencial de las entidades 
de crédito y las empresas de inversión, por la que se modifica la Directiva 2002/87/
CE y se derogan las Directivas 2006/48/CE y 2006/49/CE. 
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2.5.1. Single Rule Book. 
The objective of the Single Rule Book is to establish a series of prudential regulations 
common to all the institutions of the European Union. This harmonization in prudential 
regulation guarantees, for instance, that the Basel III agreements are applied in the same 
way in all member countries. Furthermore, it will eliminate various loopholes in 
regulation thus contributing to improving the functioning of the European Single 
Market (ESM). 
That is why this new Single Rule Book will make the banking sector a stronger, more 
efficient and transparent sector, since it indicates and requires the same methodology to 
be used to calculate requirements such as liquidity standards or capital ratios. 
But this Single Rule Book should not be rigid, but rather this new regulatory framework 
should give flexibility to each country for the application of prudential regulation since 
economic and credit cycles do not go at the same timing throughout the European 
Union. 
That is why European countries still have the power to compel financial institutions to 
raise their capital levels, especially in assets such as real estate loans, to cope with 
future financial bubbles. In addition, each country establishes its level of countercyclical 
buffer according to the economic situation to protect the national economy and the 
banking sector from any threat that puts financial stability in check. 
Lastly, member states have reserved the power to establish the level of pillar 2 as they 
see fit, that is, they can compel entities to increase their capital levels after they have 
undergone the Supervisory Review Process (SREP) . 
2.5.2. Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
The SSM establishes a new financial supervision methodology thanks to the union of 
the different Competent National Authorities (CNAs) of the participating EU countries 
and the European Central Bank. This new supervisory mechanism has the fundamental 
objectives of guaranteeing a robust and stable European banking system, and increasing 
economic integration in Europe. 
Participants are all those countries that are part of the Eurosystem in addition to the 
countries belonging to the EU that want to cooperate with the ECB and adhere to this 
supervision system. 
In this supervisory system, the largest and most significant entities are directly 
supervised by the ECB. The rest of the entities are the ANCs that supervise them 
directly and the ECB indirectly. An entity is significant if one of the following criteria is 
met: 
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• Total consolidated assets of over 30,000 million Euros.  
• Percentage of assets over GDP above 20 % as long as its consolidated total 
Assets do not exceed 5 billion Euros.  
• It is the largest entity in the country or one of the three largest. 
• It has subsidiaries in more than one member country of the SSM and that its 
Assets or Liabilities in the rest of the countries are greater than 20 % of its total 
Assets or Liabilities.  
• An entity applying for or receiving aid funds from the European Stability 
Mechanism. 
Regarding the SSM supervision model, the ECB is the competent authority that 
guarantees its effective operation. Furthermore, it is the ECB that supervises that the 
SSM works properly. 
In the SSM, entities are classified into two groups. The first group corresponds to the 
entities identified as significant, and the second group corresponds to the other entities. 
Once classified, the ECB directly supervises the entities classified in the first group, 
articulating their actions through the Joint Supervision Teams (ECS). These teams are 
made up of employees of the ECB and the ANCs. The role of these teams is to assess 
risk profiles continuously, as well as to ensure that solvency and liquidity are adequate. 
The ANCs, on the other hand, are the authorities with competence in direct supervision 
over the entities classified in the second group. However, the ECB may issue guidelines 
to try to ensure proper supervision of these less significant entities or even assume 
direct supervision of them when deemed necessary.  
2.5.3. Harmonization of guarantee funds. 
Another great step in the European Union has been to establish a Deposit guarantee 
fund in order to give savers security by depositing their money in entities in which their 
solvency status was questionable. This harmonization of guarantee funds in the EU 
countries and their minimum requirements is regulated in the Directiva 1994/19/CE, as 
amended by the Directive 2009/19/CE. 
In recent years, especially in 2014 with the new Directiva 2014/49/UE, new measures 
have been added for the protection of European investors. However, these measures 
remain short-range from the point of view of investors and from Germany, according to 
the recent proposal by his Finance Minister Olaf Scholz. Both advocate a common 
Deposit Guarantee Fund for the entire European Union, since at present, although there 
is some harmonization, it is not enough. 
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3. Solvency regulation and bank profitability. 
The increase that has been experienced in recent times on the pressure on regulation 
is a necessary and widespread issue throughout all the countries of the world. It is very 
difficult to know what is the degree and what type of regulation is necessary to face all 
those operational problems produced after the financial crisis of 2008. 
It is very common for financial regulation to oscillate to try to achieve a balance that 
allows it to make the financial sector work properly, contributing to the development of 
the real economy without establishing too many restrictions. 
This behavior in financial regulation is sometimes contradictory. The G20  summits 25
during 2008 and 2010 argued the need for bank bailouts on the grounds that these were 
too large to fall. However, the intention was to overcome the past crisis by creating even 
larger financial institutions, protecting themselves behind the hypothesis that systemic 
risk only depends on bank size. 
Among all the regulations related to the financial sector, the regulations regarding 
solvency are perhaps the most important. The Basel II agreement was unable to respond 
when the crisis came, and the emergency led to the opening of the Basel III agreement. 
Until 2019, one of the most common doubts was knowing what impact this new Basel 
III agreement would have on the economic recovery. The impact on credit is probably 
the most questioned during these years of implementation of the measures. Basel III 
was created under the assumption that the banking sector could repeat the same failures 
committed in the years prior to the crisis, however the sector was already transforming 
in the years prior to 2008 as they were facing increasingly profitability downs and 
already too expensive operating structures. 
The profitability crisis of the banking entities that will be analyzed below means that the 
banking sector is reorienting its business model where there will no longer be those 
oversized costs of the past and where the composition of the commercial network has 
been drastically reduced. It is very risky to accept that the regulation on the banking 
sector is going to change this situation since the architecture of this new regulation is 
not complete. 
In short, the new banking business environment that is being created is an environment 
in which there is nothing clear about whether or not it is appropriate for banks to carry 
out their function and produce multiplicative effects of credit on investment. 
The profitability of the banks has been falling year after year until reaching profitability 
that are more characteristic of low value institutions than of institutions dedicated to risk 
diversification and intermediation. 
 Group formed by the most developed countries in the world. They represent 85% of the world economy. It includes 25
countries like the USA, Germany or China.
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3.1. Profitability crisis. 
Since 2012, a very deep process has been carried out that has consisted of a profound 
restructuring of the Spanish banking sector. Although we have been implementing 
reforms for several years, the market still perceives threats and challenges. 
The result of the Spanish banks in 2018 has been slightly higher than in 2017. 
Paradoxically, during the first weeks of January 2019, the sector evolved favorably on 
the Stock Market, although after knowing the profit results for the 2018 financial year, 
the market reacted negatively. This is because although the profits of the entities have 
improved as a whole, the profitability indicators such as the RoE are relative, yielding 
insufficient returns that in many cases do not cover the cost of capital. 
In this context, regulation plays a key role. The Spanish banking sector, and the 
European, is perhaps the most transversal economic sector, interconnected with other 
sectors through financial flows. That is why the great regulatory pressure it receives. If 
the GDP falls, it is immediately noticed in the banking business. This sector is 
especially vulnerable to weaknesses in growth or external threats. 
By external threats we understand that they are currently made up of well-known 
institutional issues such as the Brexit resolution, the Banking Union or Italian political 
instability. All these external threats have a negative impact on European financial 
institutions, and even more so on Spanish banks, which have a large international 
presence. 
Another of the important factors that have led the banking sector to this crisis situation 
are, on the one hand, the economic slowdown in the euro area, and on the other hand, 
the technological irruption of new, more flexible competitors in terms of structure and 
activity less regulated. 
The sector's interest margin will remain very narrow and bank income will be pressured 
by the large number of costs of banking structures. 
That is why the AEB employers criticize the excess of bank regulation in matters of 
solvency of Spanish banks. The Banco de España maintains that the highest quality 
capital in the Spanish banking sector is one of the lowest in Europe and, for this reason, 
it has requested that a reduction in the payment of dividends be made in order to 
strengthen the entities' own resources. 
On the part of the banks, it is maintained that the sector is in a very robust solvency 
situation, alerting the regulatory authorities that this excessive regulatory pressure will 
end up restricting the issuance of credit. 
The criticism is expressed in the form of surprise on the part of the banking association, 
when they see that contradictory policies are being carried out. On the one hand, interest 
rates have been lowered to increase credit in the economy, and on the other hand, more 
capital is required, reducing their profitability and depriving them of capital to issue the 
credit for which they are encouraged. 
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Capital requirements were initially set at 7 %, becoming 10 % and currently ending at 
12 %. This increase in requirements makes the market penalize the banking sector in the 
Stock Market, since investors think that the regulator has located some fault that they 
have not been able to see. 
Doubts regarding the solvency of the Spanish banking sector have always been very 
present, but now they must focus on profitability after more than ten years of 
destruction of shareholder value. Therefore, progress is necessary to improve 
profitability since it has become a concern of regulatory authorities. Mergers are 
requested in order to solve these profitability problems, believing that the synergies that 
occur will benefit the creation of value. 
3.2. Banking Profitability. 
Any bank takes steps to ensure value creation for its shareholders. This creation of 
value materializes when the profitability obtained by your business exceeds 
expectations. 
The profitability, when we put it in the context of a bank, must indicate what has been 
the return or productivity of the capital that has been used in the banking business. 
Regardless of the analysis carried out to study profitability, it is necessary to obtain at 
least an economic indicator as a criterion in the measure and a reference on which to 
look to know if the profitability results obtained are positive or not. The Banco de 
España establishes that the most suitable indicator of profitability for banking entities is 
that which relates the entities' profit with their own resources. 
According to Muñoz (2009), profitability is nothing more than a quotient between the 
results obtained over a period of time and the investment that has been made or with the 
financing used. However, there are different ways of defining this ratio in order to adapt 
it to the context or the type of economic activity that is carried out. 
Archel, Lizarraga, Sánchez and Cano (2012) establish that two fundamental objectives 
are pursued when performing a profitability analysis. The first of these objectives is to 
try to evaluate the returns obtained from the investments. The second objective is to 
evaluate the return that is obtained for the shareholders. Therefore, the most used ratios 
to evaluate profitability are the financial profitability and economic profitability ratios. 
Depending on the element included in the numerator or denominator of each ratio, we 
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•  
On the one hand, we identify Cash Flow as the result before taxes, adding provisions 
and amortizations. These last two items are added so that the analysis is complete, 
however, in practice, Cash Flow is not used as an element of the numerator since both 
the provisions and depreciation items are susceptible to accounting manipulation 
resulting in an indicator of profitability little objective. 
However, the regulations, being aware of this reality, establish that Net Profit is the 
element to be used in the profitability ratio numerator, since it incorporates all cost 
items and is the most basic result indicator. 
Regarding the denominator, the regulations consider that it must be the item of the own 
resources of the entities and not the average total assets. This is due to the fact that the 
average total Assets is immersed in the Own Resources, through the following 
expression: 
 
Therefore, we are left with: 
 
This return on assets has the drawback that it is not useful for comparing entities 
focused on different businesses (investment banking, private, commercial, etc.) since 
their degree of leverage and their level of risks differ. The Return On Equity (RoE) is 
the indicator per excellence. In order to maximize its value, in recent years entities have 
been developing new methods to assess their profitability with respect to their level of 
exposure to different risks. This has been termed as risk-adjusted return. 
3.3. Profitability evolution. 
European banks have not seen double-digit profitability figures for years. This today 
is not the normal thing caused to a great extent by the great pressure in the regulation 
that exists on the banking entities to guarantee their solvency. Furthermore, the current 
situation of negative interest rates, which causes a smaller intermediation margin, 
already mentioned and the new competitive forces mean that profitability does not 
recover and remains stagnant. 
Before the 2008 financial crisis, the profitability indicators of European banks were 
very high, with the banking sector being the sector that created the most value in the 
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markets. In recent years, this situation has changed and regulatory pressure began after 
2008. 
The most general response to alleviate this situation of declining profitability has been 
to reduce costs, trying to increase banking efficiency. Spain was among the countries 
with the best efficiency in 2008 and has continued in the same situation in recent years. 
Below, in Table 1 and Table 2, is the RoE for both the EU entities as a whole and a 
breakdown by country as a comparison with Spain. 
Focusing now on Spain, in the following table we can see how the evolution of Spanish 
bank profitability is in an intermediate situation if we compare it with France, Italy, 
Table 1. Return on equity of all credit institutions belonging to the EU (2008-2019). 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
RoE 
(%)
-2.78 1.02 3.91 -0.78 -1.57 2.10 3.20 4.35 3.50 5.79 6.08 -
Source: Consolidated Banking Data from ECB
Table 2. Return on equity in a sample of Eurozone countries (2008-2019). 
% Spain France Italy Germany Netherlands
2019 7.10 - - - -
2018 8.19 6.71 5.85 2.22 8.30
2017 6.99 6.41 7.09 2.73 9.12
2016 5.03 6.46 -9.14 2.12 7.64
2015 6.59 6.78 3.13 1.72 7.55
2014 6.69 4.55 -3.16 2.50 3.56
2013 5.77 5.98 -12.79 1.32 5.49
2012 -24.88 3.38 -1.19 1.34 5.61
2011 0.16 5.63 -14.32 2.30 7.34
2010 8.54 8.33 3.77 2.33 7.19
2009 8.89 4.64 3.83 -2.68 -0.43
2008 12.36 2.22 4.91 -11.38 -12.53
Source: Consolidated Banking Data from ECB
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Germany and the Netherlands. In 2008, Spain had the highest rate of return, well above 
France and Italy, which gave positive values for the same year. 
This situation began to change from the year 2011 where the profitability of the Spanish 
banking system was no longer the highest, but was at a midpoint, surpassing only the 
Italian average. 
For the last year that the European Central Bank presents data on RoE, we can see how 
Spain is placed again among the countries whose banking system is more profitable, but 
the difference with the rest of the countries has become narrower. 
If we break down these data, we see in the following table how RoE has evolved for the 
different Spanish banks of greater size. 
Table 3. Return on Equity of the Spanish’s banking system (2008-2019)
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
RoE 
(%)
12.36 8.89 8.54 0.16 -24.88 5.77 6.69 6.59 5.03 6.99 8.19 7.10
Source: Consolidated Banking Data from ECB and Financial Stability Report of the BdE year 2020.
Table 4. Return on Equity and its variation of the largest Spanish banks (2008-2019)
% Banki
nter











2008 14.10 - 25.50 - 18.12 - 24.08 - - - - -
2009 11.30 -19.86 21.20 -16.86 14.01 -22.68 13.75 -42.90 - - - -
2010 7.78 -31.15 17.20 -18.87 11.75 -16.13 9.02 -34.40 - - - -
2011 6.84 -12.08 11.30 -34.30 9.47 -19.40 4.71 -47.78 0 - 5.20 -
2012 3.09 -54.82 5.30 -53.10 3.06 -67.69 1.63 -65.39 0 - 1.00 -80.77
2013 6.49 110.03 9.20 73.58 5.23 70.92 2.76 69.33 5.90 - 2.20 120.00
2014 8.28 27.58 5.60 -39.13 7.64 46.08 3.54 28.26 8.40 42.37 1.70 -22.73
2015 10.65 28.62 5.40 -3.57 7.40 -3.14 5.96 68.36 9.90 17.86 2.20 29.41
2016 13.23 24.23 7.20 33.33 7.66 3.51 6.47 8.56 8.20 -17.17 4.10 86.36
2017 12.30 -7.03 8.50 18.06 7.87 2.74 6.05 -6.49 8.10 -1.22 6.60 60.98
2018 13.00 5.69 12.20 43.53 8.43 7.12 1.97 -67.44 7.90 -2.47 7.70 16.67
2019 12.64 -2.77 10.10 -17.21 7.02 -16.73 6.92 251.27 6.00 -24.05 5.60 -27.27
BANKIA in 2011 and 2012 had losses so the RoE is 0. 
CaixaBank does not have data prior to 2011 as it is the old Caixa and the data is not comparable.
Source: Cinco días Daily. https://cincodias.elpais.com/cincodias/2019/11/15/companias/1573843554_432640.html
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3.4. Actions of the Spanish banking system to guarantee profitability. 
Since its origins, the banking sector has had a business based fundamentally on 
trying to maximize the net interest margin. This brokerage margin is nothing more than 
the difference between the interest rate charged to customers for lending money and the 
interest rate paid to the savings of depositors. The key behind this type of business is to 
try to obtain a higher profitability thanks to a greater interest margin. The fact that bank 
entities carry an interest rate higher than the interest rate they pay is justified by the risk 
that these entities assume, either due to term or volume conditions. 
Today this model is practically finished as it does not manage to be an attractive 
business in terms of profitability. As we could see in section 3.3. bank financial 
profitability has been declining. This is because interest rates have been reduced to 
practically zero and even be negative. 
This reduction in the intermediation margin of banks leads to the only possible solution 
to increase profitability is the issuance of a greater volume of credits and the capture of 
a greater volume of deposits. The cooling that occurred in economic activity after 2007 
implied that the demand for loans fell, making this possible solution not possible. 
As we have seen, since the origin of the past financial crisis it has led supervisory 
authorities to raise capital requirements. Banks have had to maintain high amounts of 
capital in the form of reserves to face possible future losses, making it impossible to 
allocate these funds to the issuance of credits and, therefore, to increase their net interest 
margin. 
In this context of difficulty to guarantee a minimum profitability, banks have been 
implementing a series of measures to try to cope with the profitability crisis experienced 
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Increase in commissions. 
This type of income is an ideal source of income for the banking sector since it does 
not carry any type of risk. The gratuitousness of some of the banking services has 
become history since at present the very low interest margins do not compensate the 
cost of these services. This has had a significant impact in Spain as it is one of the EU 
countries with the most expensive banking services. 
Automation and digitization of the sector. 
Million-dollar investments are increasingly being made in digitization and bank 
automation processes. The arrival of smartphones in our lives has led to the 
development of mobile applications with which customers can manage their bank 
accounts or perform any service in person. 
The simplicity with which the banking websites have been developed has led to a 
simplification when contracting a loan or operating on the stock exchange. Customer 
self-sufficiency has led to a “Self service” model that makes physical offices 
unnecessary. 
On the other hand, automation is being key in the banking business. New software and 
new technologies in Machine Learning  and Big Data  are beginning to replace human 26 27
labor. Automated credit granting is proof of this as it reduces the time in the contracting 
of a credit using artificial intelligence in the evaluation of applicants. 
Dismissal of staff. 
Spain has been the European country with the highest number of commercial bank 
offices per inhabitant. The technological revolution and all the matters carried out to 
restructure the entities has led to the closure of most of these entities. As a consequence, 
the workers in these branches have become an excessive cost, carrying out large 
dismissal processes throughout the banking sector. 
Self-competition. 
The new paradigm has led banks to take advantage of the low operating costs of all 
those financial services offered through applications. The great competition of online 
banking has turned out to be yet another threat that further limited the profitability of 
traditional banking. That is why traditional entities have strived to acquire digital 
competitors or to create their own subsidiaries. 
 Branch of artificial intelligence that allows machines to learn without being expressly programmed to do so.26
 New Science that pursue to treat large data sets that exceed the ability of traditional computer applications to deal 27
with them in a reasonable amount of time.
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In this way it is possible to attract and retain the young customer to those called digital 
natives who are not attracted to the bank of a lifetime. 
3.5. Banking situation derived from the current health emergency situation by 
COVID-19. 
The world is currently experiencing a health crisis caused by the pandemic caused by 
the SARS-CoV-2  virus. The high speed of spread of this virus, as well as the mortality 28
and incidence that it is having especially in western countries led the World Health 
Organization (WHO) to classify the situation as a pandemic on March 11, 2020. 
The great social and economic impact has brought about the total paralysis of the world 
economy, dedicating most of the countries' resources to the fight against the disease. As 
an exceptional measure in view of the great increase in the number of cases of 
contagion in Spain, the Spanish Government, chaired by Pedro Sánchez Pérez-Castejón 
(Madrid, February 29, 1972), held an extraordinary session on March 14, 2020 to vote 
to approve the alarm status. After its approval by majority, the main measure carried out 
was the imposition of the national quarantine. This measure came into force on March 
15 at 00:00, where since then Spain and all its citizens have given their confidence to 
the effectiveness of the measure. 
This health crisis has already affected all sectors of the world economy. Banking has 
been one of those sectors affected and will continue to suffer the consequences in the 
medium term. This situation, in addition, has reached a situation of weakness in 
economic growth and where all businesses face this new threat caused by Covid-19. 
The banking sector has been preparing itself, evaluating the possible adversities that 
may arise, such as an increase in defaults, an increase in provisions, lower income, less 
credit. All this added to the pressure of a negative interest rate scenario. 
For its part, the Banco de España in its recent publication of the statistics on the 
supervision of credit institutions referring to the last quarter of 2019 shows positive 
results in terms of the quality of the solvency of the entities during this year, where the 
highest quality capital ratio (CET 1) was 12.79 % compared to 12.46 % in 2018. Thus, 
entities have more capacity to grant credit and deal with defaults. 
The same statistics also show negative data regarding bank profitability. The RoE of 
2019 was 7.10 % compared to 8.19 % of 2018, again showing that the sector suffers 
from a problem of low profitability, which has worsened significantly during the last 
year, especially due to the impact of the pandemic. Investors are now demanding a 
higher risk premium and therefore the difference between return and cost of capital is 
increased, which is what is required for investing in the business. 
 New type of coronavirus that affects humans first detected in December 2019 in Wuhan (China). For the most part, in 28
80% of cases it only produces mild respiratory symptoms.
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But, this situation is not affecting all banking entities in the same way. The largest 
significant entities that are under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank 
had capital levels of 15.57 %, and the smaller entities of 22.90 %. In addition, its default 
ratio has improved to stand at 3.23 % for significant entities, and 2.55 % for less 
significant ones. 
Need for new financing 
Turning to the issue of bank liquidity, entities have experienced a decrease in their 
liquidity coverage indicator, which is 164.84 % at the end of 2019. This indicator has 
been calculated according to the indications of the Bank of Spain, placing the liquidity 
buffer in the numerator and the net outflow of liquidity in the denominator, all taking 
into account an adverse scenario of liquidity need of 30 calendar days. 
This decrease in the liquidity of the sector places banks in a less favorable position to 
face the current Covid-19 crisis. The final impact will depend on how much GDP falls 
during 2020 and how long it will take for this economic growth to recover in the 
coming years. The measures that have been taken regarding the relaxation of the 
regulation on capital, provisions and liquidity, and the granting of public guarantees, 
have lessened the negative impact, but even so the banking sector will experience 
significant losses. 
Covid-19 Prudential Response 
Covid-19 has brought about a macro-financial disruption. This disjunction can 
already be seen in different indicators, especially in the case of systemic risk, which 
have led to a series of supervisory actions. These measures range from deciding which 
macroeconomic and microeconomic instruments to use, to how to adapt this adversity 
situation in accounting. 
In this context, the Systemic Risk Indicator (IRS) has increased sharply as the volatility 
of the financial markets has increased. This IRS has already been rebounding since the 
Brexit referendum in 2016, falling from that year and until 2019 to historic lows. Again 
in 2020 it has been rebounding as the Covid-19 has greatly strained financial markets 
and volatility has soared. 
A series of macroprudential measures have been taken in order to mitigate the negative 
impact that the banking sector will have to bear in the coming months. Below I list the 
most important ones: 
• Construction of capital buffers and guaranteeing that the conditions for granting 
loans are adequate. This contributes to smoothing the financial cycle and limiting 
systemic risk during expansionary stages and mitigating the adjustment of banks' 
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credit during recessionary stages. The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) has been 
placed by the Banco de España at 0 %, with the intention of keeping it at that level 
until the economic and financial effects derived from the impact of Covid-19 
disappear. 
• Temporary possibility to work with macroprudential requirements lower than 
those required. For this, the use of the capital and liquidity buffers already available 
is facilitated. 
• The adoption of the new methodology to identify entities of global systemic 
interest is delayed one year until 2023, as well as the full implementation of the 
Basel III agreement. 
• The transition period for the floor of the capital requirements calculated through 
internal models is also delayed until 2028. 
Regarding the microprudential field, a series of measures have also been taken to try to 
give flexibility to the sector in aspects such as operations, prudential and regulatory 
requirements, in order to try to establish a situation of comfort for the banking sector to 
guarantee its correct operation. For example, the following ones: 
• Guarantee the continuity of the banking business using all those resources 
released after the adaptation of all those activities related to supervision. For 
example, the delay in the bank stress exercises or the inclusion of the pandemic risk 
in the contingency plans of the entities in order to be able to request extensions in 
the terms to fulfill the requirements currently in force. 
• Try to use the different buffers available in the most effective way possible to 
mitigate the losses derived from the Covid-19 pandemic. 
On the other hand, and for accounting purposes, the pandemic has also influenced the 
way in which entities report their accounting and financial information. That is why the 
different national and international regulatory bodies have allowed a series of measures 
to try to give an optimal response to the effects of the pandemic on accounting and 
financial information. Among these measures is the relaxation of accounting regulations 
to try to calculate adequately the deterioration of credit risk during 2020. 
All these measures are aimed at preventing the issuance of the loan from falling and 
trying to mitigate the negative impact that the Covid-19 will have on the profitability of 
the entities. This last aspect is very important since the sector, as previously seen in this 
same work, has been going through a profitability crisis for years. Therefore, both the 
public guarantees and the moratoriums that are being allowed will make private agents 
more able to pay, thus reducing defaults and, as a consequence, banks will not have to 
make excessive provisions that will make profitability fall extremely. 
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Finally, another of the last measures adopted has been to eliminate the distribution of 
dividends related to the years 2019 and 2020, and limit bonuses to employees. 
Furthermore, both the Banco de España and the European Banking Authority have 
recommended avoiding repurchasing shares to remunerate shareholders. 
4.Effect of the solvency regulation on the profitability of the Spanish banking 
sector. 
4.1.Structural equation models.  
We begin this last chapter by implementing a typology of multivariate statistical 
models used to estimate what effect and what relationships exist between various 
variables. These models are known as Structural Equation Models (SEM) and are 
alternative models to the traditional, more flexible and less restrictive regression 
models. This flexibility underlies the possibility of being able to introduce measurement 
errors in both endogenous and exogenous variables.  
However, SEM models are more laborious and more complex to implement than 
traditional factor analysis or regression models, but today, thanks to the new software 
that exists in the market, we can estimate them with some ease using new graphical 
environments such as the AMOS belonging to the SPSS software or in R with its 
package lavaan.  
The undoubted advantage of using SEM models is that it is possible to establish what 
type and what direction exists between the relationships of the different variables that 
we introduce in the model, in order to then estimate the corresponding parameters.  
We can find a different variety of models derived from this type of methodology. There 
are as many SEM models as there are purposes or levels of complexity in the different 
studies that you want to carry out. Here are some examples:  
• Multiple regression with multicollinearity 
• Confirmatory factor analysis 
• Second order factor analysis 
• Path Analysis 
• Complete causal model with latent variables 
• Latent curve model 
• Multilevel models 
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• Multi-group models 
• Models based on means 
• Mediation analysis  
The present chapter focuses mainly on SEM Path Analysis models since it is a typology 
in which all the variables are observable except for prediction errors. Therefore, for its 
application, the same methodology and method of execution of the model established in 
Fruet, J., Millán, J., Caridad and Ocerin, J and Pérez, J. (2019) will be followed. 
4.2.Types of variables.  
Structural equation models have some peculiarities regarding the type of variables 
they use. These variables can be classified according to the role they play and according 
to the way in which they are measured. Therefore, below, we list the different types of 
variables that we can find in a structural equation model:  
• Variable observed. This type of variable measures individuals, for example, 
questions on a questionnaire.  
• Latent variable. With this type of variable we can introduce into the model a 
characteristic that we would like to observe but that we cannot and that does not 
have any type of error in its measurement (Factor in an exploratory factor 
analysis).  
• Variable error. With this variable we collect the measurement errors of any 
variable, both individually and jointly. These errors are those that are not included 
in the model and that can affect the measurement of an observed variable. They 
are latent variables since they cannot be observed directly.  
• Grouping variable. Categorical variable that indicates the different 
subpopulations to be compared.  
• Exogenous variable. They are the independent variables of the model, those 
that affect the exogenous variable and that are not affected by other variables.  
• Endogenous variable. It is the variable or variables to be explained by the 
model. These types of variables are always accompanied by an error and receive 
the effect of one or more other variables.  
In structural equation systems, it is common to visually represent variables and their 
different relationships through what is called “path diagrams”. We indicate below the 
way in which this technique visually represents the different parts of the process that 
carries out the SEM models.  
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1. The relationships between the different variables are represented by arrows. 
The direction of each arrow is from the cause variable to the effect variable.  
2. The relationship between two independent variables or between two error 
terms that do not have a causal interpretation, is represented by a bidirectional 
arrow.  
3. Observable variables are represented within a square.  
4. Latent variables are represented within circles.  
These visual diagrams should be simple and contain only those relationships between 
variables that have a consistent theoretical basis. Some of the most important figures are 
shown below.  
4.3.Sampling and specification of variables.  
The sample selected to perform the statistical analysis proposed in the following 
section 4.4. It has been prepared thanks to the database provided by the Banco de 
España regarding accounting and financial aspects of the different Spanish deposit 
institutions (Banks, Savings Banks and credit institutions). 
The different accounting information provided by the Banco de España used the 
consolidated balance sheet and the consolidated profit and loss account of the Spanish 
deposit institutions for the period 2007-2019. Based on this accounting information, 
different financial ratios have been established in order to analyze what effect these 
ratios have on the solvency of the entities (Rose, 2002). 
Table 5 shows the ratios selected for the analysis, differentiating the type of variable 
that each ratio represents. 
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• Variable error. With this variable we collect the measurement errors of any variable, both 
individually and jointly. These errors are those that are not included in the model and that can 
affect the measurement of an observed variable. They are latent variables since they cannot be 
observed directly.
• Grouping variable. Categorical variable that indicates the different subpopulations to be 
compared.
• Exogenous variable. They are the independent variables of the model, those that affect the 
exog nous variable and that are not affected by other variables.
• Endogenous variable. It is the variable or variables to be explained by the model. These types of 
variables are always accompanied by an error and receive the effect of one or more other 
variables.
In structural equation systems, it is common to visually represent variables and their different 
relationships through what is called “path diagrams”. We indicate below the way in which this 
technique visually represents the different parts of the process that carries out the SEM models.
1. The relationships between the different variables are represented by arrows. The direction of 
each arrow is from the cause variable to the effect variable.
2. The relationship between two independent variables or between two error terms that do not 
have a causal interpretation, is represented by a bidirectional arrow.
3. Observable variables are represented within a square.
4. Latent variables are represented within circles.
These visual diagrams should be simple and contain only those relationships between variables that 
have a consistent theoretical basis. Some of the most important figures are shown below.
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Elementos de la representación visual 
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                               Asociación de correlación o covarianza 
 
                               Asociación de regresión 
Fuente: Elaboración propia. 
 
6.3. Aplicación del modelo “Path Analysis”. 
Como mencionamos más arriba, a efectos de profundizar aún más nuestra tesis y 
sustentarla con un modelo matemático muy difundido en la actualidad, hemos decidido 
utilizar en nuestra investigación el modelo SEM, y específicamente el “Path Analysis”. En 
el estudio se incluyen stados financieros consolidados de las entidades de depósito 
españolas durante 45 años (diciembre de 1971 a diciembre de 2015), utilizándose 10 ratios 
aplic dos a dichos estados financieros; es decir, una muestra de 450 datos. Asimismo, 
hemos estudiado las relaciones causales entre los mismos y los hemos desglosado en 
variables observables y no observables. 
 
En relación al método SEM utilizado, “Path Analysis”, se puede mencionar que el mismo 
permite estimar modelos de ecuaciones y analizar la relación causal entre ellas. Una vez 
que la hipótesis esté clara, se van estimando las relaciones entre las distintas variables 
observables y no observables y se incluyen las restricciones que se estimen oportunas. El 
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Figure 3. Diagram’s figures of SEM 
Source: own elaboration
4.3.1.Consolidated Balance Sheet. 
Table 6 shows the consolidated assets for the period analyzed. It can be seen how 
these have decreased by -11.24 % from 2,836,829,634 € in 2007 to 2,517,898,986 € in 
2019. 
In 2007, the Credits section was the largest asset investment, being 77.86 % of total 
assets. However, over the years, investment in loans has been reduced, becoming 65.90 
% of total assets in 2019.
Table 5. Variables and ratios selected for analysis
Acronym Ratios Type of variables
X1 Increase in ROE Exogenous




Y1 Net Benefit Endogenous
Y2 ROA Endogenous
Y3 Administrative Costs/Operating Income Endogenous






Table 6. Consolidated assets from December 31, 2007 to December 31, 2019
ASSETS 2007 2010 2012 2015 2017 2019
CREDITS 2,208,872,743.00 € 2,268,404,055.00 € 2,090,466,054.00 € 1,676,013,301.00 € 1,680,260,216.00 € 1,659,409,374.00 €
Credit System 229,823,701.00 € 188,441,535.00 € 229,550,279.00 € 135,626,425.00 € 214,793,432.00 € 178,199,615.00 €
Public Administrations 38,755,249.00 € 74,491,997.00 € 96,890,356.00 € 85,708,582.00 € 74,339,530.00 € 63,785,565.00 €
ORS 1,691,933,135.00 € 1,782,291,283.00 € 1,537,748,013.00 € 1,274,652,552.00 € 1,199,106,319.00 € 1,135,589,579.00 €
External Sector 248,360,658.00 € 223,179,240.00 € 226,277,406.00 € 180,025,742.00 € 192,020,935.00 € 281,834,615.00 €
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If we look at the total assets of the banking system we can see how during the last nine 
years they have been decreasing, going from 3,119,256,591 € in 2010 to 2,517,898,986 
€ in 2019. The main reason we can explain this reduction in assets is due to mainly to 
the deterioration produced in the portfolios of the entities. 
Regarding liabilities and equity, in Table 7 we can see how these have been decreasing 
during the analyzed period. This reduction has been 11.24%, from a total of 
2,836,829,582 € in 2007 to 2,517,903,626 € in 2019. 
The largest section over the years has been the Deposits section. This section went from 
being 72.14 % of total liabilities and equity in 2007 to being 70.97 % at the end of 2019.
VALUES OTHER THAN 
SHARES and 
PARTICIPATIONS
256,938,573.00 € 377,801,449.00 € 489,462,384.00 € 398,320,348.00 € 318,530,468.00 € 307,576,732.00 €
Residents in Spain 176,056,951.00 € 313,915,760.00 € 406,653,886.00 € 323,717,990.00 € 247,449,970.00 € 219,685,642.00 €
Residents in the rest of the 
world
80,881,622.00 € 63,885,689.00 € 82,808,498.00 € 74,602,358.00 € 71,080,498.00 € 87,891,090.00 €
SHARES AND 
PARTICIPATIONS
183,388,969.00 € 180,188,964.00 € 257,153,693.00 € 245,516,660.00 € 258,418,505.00 € 250,035,912.00 €
Residents in Spain 101,607,778.00 € 102,877,982.00 € 166,986,497.00 € 133,401,336.00 € 145,383,054.00 € 131,335,186.00 €
External Sector 81,781,191.00 € 77,310,982.00 € 90,167,196.00 € 112,115,324.00 € 113,035,451.00 € 118,700,726.00 €
OTHER NOT 
SECTORISED
187,629,349.00 € 292,862,123.00 € 419,303,812.00 € 325,642,016.00 € 292,654,914.00 € 300,876,968.00 €
Cash 8,541,647.00 € 7,882,548.00 € 7,433,738.00 € 7,957,872.00 € 8,071,726.00 € 9,315,633.00 €
Others 179,087,702.00 € 284,979,575.00 € 411,870,074.00 € 317,684,144.00 € 284,583,188.00 € 291,561,335.00 €
TOTAL ASSETS 2,836,829,634.00 € 3,119,256,591.00 € 3,256,385,943.00 € 2,645,492,325.00 € 2,549,864,103.00 € 2,517,898,986.00 €
Source: Own elaboration and consolidated data based on Bank of Spain data.
Table 7. Consolidated liabilities and equity from December 31, 2007 to December 31, 2019
LIABILITIES 2007 2010 2012 2015 2017 2019
DEPOSITS 2,046,684,600.00 € 2,244,624,468.00 € 2,224,677,498.00 € 1,887,280,517.00 € 1,805,740,472.00 € 1,787,099,432.00 €
Credit system 222,760,416.00 € 236,123,047.00 € 524,074,376.00 € 274,080,774.00 € 293,383,380.00 € 214,414,505.00 €
Public Administrations and 
Provisions
74,470,976.00 € 75,287,050.00 € 67,341,464.00 € 76,097,156.00 € 60,910,483.00 € 68,816,882.00 €
ORS 1,319,390,781.00 € 1,434,103,776.00 € 1,304,172,269.00 € 1,255,068,129.00 € 1,193,835,580.00 € 1,252,423,294.00 €
External sector 430,062,427.00 € 499,110,595.00 € 329,089,389.00 € 282,034,458.00 € 257,611,029.00 € 251,444,751.00 €
FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 
ISSUED
395,916,341.00 € 377,454,686.00 € 324,418,474.00 € 184,175,805.00 € 200,289,371.00 € 226,864,748.00 €
ACCRUALS AND OTHER 
LIABILITIES
192,057,582.00 € 224,072,203.00 € 315,982,676.00 € 220,408,672.00 € 196,857,668.00 € 192,717,340.00 €
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND 
EQUITY
2,836,829,582.00 € 3,119,257,058.00 € 3,256,385,942.00 € 2,645,492,331.00 € 2,549,864,103.00 € 2,517,903,626.00 €
Source: Own elaboration and consolidated data based on Bank of Spain data.
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4.3.2.Consolidated income statement. 
This section shows the consolidated income statement during the analysis period. If 
we look at Table 8 we can see how the financial products section has decreased 
dramatically during these last 13 years. Its decrease has accounted for 71 %. 
If we focus on the operating income section in 2007, we appreciate how its participation 
in  total  financial  products  was  24.27  %.  On  the  other  hand,  operating  expenses 
represented 24.71 % of total financial products.
We especially highlight the year 2012. In this year,  operating income was negative, 
mainly due to the great restructuring process carried out during this year, where the 
sector had to get rid of a large amount of toxic assets that accumulated on its balance 
sheets over the past years.
Table 8. Consolidated income statement from December 31, 2007 to December 31, 2019
REVENUE AND 
EXPENSES
2007 2010 2012 2015 2017 2019
Financial products 113,599,765.00 € 77,091,165.00 € 80,464,525.00 € 43,462,892.00 € 32,976,000.00 € 32,950,000.00 €
Financial expenses 81,458,355.00 € 42,798,951.00 € 47,725,067.00 € 17,052,142.00 € 9,798,000.00 € 9,801,000.00 €
Interest Margin 32,141,410.00 € 34,292,214.00 € 32,739,458.00 € 26,410,750.00 € 23,178,000.00 € 23,149,000.00 €
Income from equity 
insert. & other 
products & expenses
32,977,549.00 € 29,020,664.00 € 26,767,975.00 € 25,121,253.00 € 23,467,000.00 € 26,238,000.00 €
Gross margin 65,118,959.00 € 63,312,878.00 € 59,507,433.00 € 51,532,003.00 € 46,646,000.00 € 49,387,000.00 €
Operating expenses 28,074,471.00 € 29,431,088.00 € 26,951,058.00 € 26,261,172.00 € 26,625,000.00 € 26,327,000.00 €
Staff costs 17,086,805.00 € 17,642,567.00 € 15,586,920.00 € 14,181,977.00 € 13,931,000.00 € 13,874,000.00 €
Net provisions 1,446,421.00 € 3,963,156.00 € 6,421,662.00 € 1,766,069.00 € 3,623,000.00 € 2,659,000.00 €
Loss due to 
impairment of 
financial assets
8,029,270.00 € 16,718,935.00 € 82,547,485.00 € 10,697,927.00 € 9,105,000.00 € 3,963,000.00 €
Net operating 
income
27,568,797.00 € 13,199,699.00 € -56,412,772.00 € 12,806,835.00 € 7,294,000.00 € 16,438,000.00 €
Losses due to 
impairment of other 
assets
1,232,835.00 € 5,290,339.00 € 33,444,028.00 € 3,414,162.00 € 9,286,000.00 € 2,026,000.00 €
Other income or loss 2,983,446.00 € 1,927,240.00 € 2,723,650.00 € 1,361,640.00 € 1,318,000.00 € 717,000.00 €
Profit before tax 29,319,408.00 € 9,836,600.00 € -87,133,150.00 € 10,754,313.00 € -674,000.00 € 15,128,000.00 €
Companies Tax 4,118,036.00 € 133,823.00 € -13,441,420.00 € 1,396,573.00 € 3,227,000.00 € 1,255,000.00 €
Provisions for social 
and charitable work
89,373.00 € 30,049.00 € 14,304.00 € 45,354.00 € 56,000.00 € 73,000.00 €
NET BENEFIT 25,111,999.00 € 9,672,728.00 € -73,706,034.00 € 9,312,386.00 € -3,957,000.00 € 13,800,000.00 €
Source: Own elaboration and consolidated data based on Bank of Spain data.
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In the last year of analysis,  operating income represented 49.89 % of total financial 
products and financial expenses were 79.90 %, evidencing the strong increase in the 
structural cost of entities.
4.4.Path analysis application.  
The statistical method Path Analysis, also known as route analysis, is an extension to 
the multiple regression model with which it is possible to evaluate theoretical statistical 
models where there are a series of dependency relationships between the different 
variables. The most important aspects of this statistical method are: 
• The researcher can establish all those regressions that he considers in order to 
study the relationship between the different dependent and independent variables. 
The dependent variables can in turn act as independent variables of other variables 
that are included in the model. 
• It seeks to know the fit of the proposed model, that is, how well the model 
represents the relationships that exist between the variables. 
• A theoretical model is proposed through the study of the different variables 
involved. This model can be represented through mathematical expressions 
(formulas) or through diagrams in order to graphically observe the proposed 
relationships between the variables. 
• In these graphic diagrams the relationships are established using arrows. These 
arrows are the routes established by the model and the estimated coefficient is 
represented on them. 
Being considered as an extension of the Multiple Regression Model, it is necessary that 
the basic assumptions of the latter are fulfilled, as well as other assumptions specific to 
the Path Analysis method. 
• First, an exploratory analysis is necessary to determine the quality of the data. 
Thus we can determine if there are missing values or extreme value data so as not 
to distort the analysis. 
• An analysis of the sample size, normality, independence in errors and 
multicollinearity, among others, is also necessary. 
The distribution is assumed to be multivariate normal. If this requirement is not met, the 
statistical tests performed may not be accurate, leading to a situation of poor fit to the 
data. To verify compliance with this hypothesis, the shape of the distribution of each 
variable can be analyzed by studying the skewness and kurtosis coefficients. On the 
other hand, the Mardia test can be performed. 
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Regarding multicollinearity, it is possible to detect it by making correlations between 
each pair of variables. If there is a correlation with values greater than 0.85, we may be 
facing a multicollinearity problem. 
4.5.Implementation of the model. 
The R software has been used to create the diagram. The lavaan package allows 
estimation and evaluation of the specified model in order to extract hypothetical 
associations between the proposed variables. The code used can be found in the 
Annexes section of this work. 
Figure 4. Goodness of fit of the model.
The diagram shows a statistical model that adequately fits the hypothesis. The banks' 




4.6.Results of the regression. 
After estimating the different parameters of the proposed model, we can see how 
they are generally significant at 5 %. This estimate has been made using the maximum 
likelihood estimate. The results obtained are shown in Table 9 below. 
Table 9. Estimated parameters
Regressions: Estimate Std.Err Z-value P(>|z|)  
y1 ~ 
x1 1.171  0.087  13.457  0.000
x2 -0.122  0.024  -5.012  0.000
x4 -2.315  0.278  -8.333  0.000
y2 ~ 
x1  1.098  0.060  18.159 0.000
x3  0.020  0.067  0.303 0.762
y3 ~  
x1  0.149  0.065 2.291 0.022
x3    0.621   0.068 9.101 0.000
x4    0.439   0.209 2.102 0.036
y4 ~  
x1    -0.160   0.069 -2.317  0.020  
x2    -0.039   0.013 -3.142 0.002
x5  -0.476  0.047 -10.092 0.000
Source: R output
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Regarding the global significance of the model, we can see in Table 10 how the p-value 
associated with the chi-square statistic is less than 5 %, indicating that the hypothesis of 
global significance of the model is accepted. 
4.6.1.Goodness-of-fit measures.  
Finally, in this section we will interpret the different measures of goodness of fit 
derived from the SEM model estimates. We can divide these measures into three 
different typologies, differentiating between those measures derived from the variance 
and covariance matrix, from the measures that are purely statistical that try to compare 
the model that has been proposed with the independence model, and the measures that 
are derive from the probability function. 
Among the measures derived from the variance and covariance matrix of the observed 
data we find the mean quarter error (RMSEA). This measure differentiates between the 
observed and estimated covariances, in order to be able to judge the impact of the 
residuals. 
Table 11 presents the estimated RMSEA whose value amounts to 0.062. For this 
measure to be considered optimal, its value must be as close to 0. As a general rule, it is 
accepted that this measure is good when its value is less than 0.1. 
Furthermore, we can find in Table 11 the SRMR measure, which is a similar measure to 
the RMSEA and is interpreted in the same way. Its value is 0.035, again indicating a 
good measure of goodness of fit of the estimated model. 
Table 10. Chi-square statistic
Model Test User Model:
Test statistic 54.023
Degrees of freedom 15
P-value (Chi-square) 0.000
Source: R output
Table 11. RMSEA and SRMR
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation: 
RMSEA 0.062  
90 Percent confidence interval - lower 0.467
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Among the second group of goodness-of-fit measures in Table 12, we highlight 
basically two. On the one hand, we have the Tucker-Lewis (TLI) measure with a value 
of 0.862 and, secondly, we find the measure called the Bentler index (CFI) with a value 
of 0.914. 
Both measures are related to the covariance ratio that explains the estimated model, with 
a value of 1 being the optimal covariance that would lead to a perfect fit. The values of 
our estimates are quite high and very close to 1, so we can affirm that these 
measurements again indicate a good fit of the model to the data. 
Regarding the last category of measures that indicate the quality of the fit, we find two 
well-known traditional measures, such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and 
the Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion (BIC). 
Both are based on the probability function and with them we can make comparisons 
between models with different number of parameters. An alternative model should be 
specified where the number of estimated parameters is different from that proposed in 
this Chapter 4. Thus we would choose the model whose AIC or BIC was of lesser value. 
In Table 13 we find that the AIC shows a value of -138,254 and that the BIC shows a 
value of -126,390. 
90 Percent confidence interval - upper 0.785
P-value RMSEA <= 0.05 0.000
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual: 
SRMR 0.035 
Source: R output
Table 12. CFI and TLI
User Model Vs baseline Model
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.914
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 0.862
Source: R output
Table 13. AIC and BIC
Loglikelihood and Information Criteria: 
Loglikelihood user model (H0) 90.127
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5. Conclusions of the investigation. 
As we mentioned in the introductory section after the outbreak of the 2008 financial 
crisis, the vast majority of banking systems in all the countries of the world were faced 
with conditions of excessive leverage and lack of liquidity. This prevented refinancing 
in the short term, causing a situation of instability in the financial system and, therefore, 
in the real economy in general. 
Faced with this situation, regulatory agencies urged the creation of new regulations 
related to the solvency of banking entities. This new regulation has placed great 
regulatory pressure on deposit institutions, leading the sector to undergo a profitability 
crisis. 
That is why the present work has focused on conducting an analysis that allows the 
different solvency requirements to be related to the impact that this regulation has had 
on profitability to try to analyze whether this hyper-protection carried out by regulators 
it has affected profitability levels even more or if, on the contrary, it has benefited them. 
The objectives proposed in the introduction have been to review the different 
regulations on bank solvency that have been established since 2007, highlighting the 
different Basel III Agreements currently in force, on the other hand, another objective 
has been to expose in a way the situation that the banking sector has experienced since 
2007 in terms of the evolution of its financial profitability is clear and direct, evidencing 
the crisis experienced by the sharp falls in this ratio; and finally, another objective has 
been to try to draw conclusions through the implementation of a statistical model that 
tries to relate the different capital requirements with the profitability of the entities. The 
data used comes from the statistical databases of the ECB and the Bank of Spain, in a 
study period that spans from 2007 to 2019. 
Banking supervision is an essential activity since it allows to establish a control over the 
financial stability of the entities in particular, and therefore, of the financial stability of 
the economy in general. All existing banking supervision regulations have been 
reviewed, both at European and national level, and the evolution of the Basel 
agreements, from Basel I to Basel III currently in force, has been reviewed. Said 
agreement places great emphasis on liquidity control, on the leverage of entities, on a 
minimum solvency ratio and on the creation of capital buffers to face unforeseen events. 
Loglikelihood unrestricted model (H1) 117.139
Akaike (AIC) -138.254
Bayesian (BIC) -126.390
Sample-size adjusted Bayesian (BIC) -190.124  
Source: R output
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From February 2020, the banking sector faces the umpteenth problem resulting from the 
current pandemic that the world is experiencing caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus. This 
has led the sector to need financing again, as liquidity has decreased. In addition, it is 
necessary to carry out a prudential response to guarantee the solvency of the entities to 
overcome this health emergency. Measures include creating new capital buffers or 
temporarily relaxing macroprudential requirements. All these measures aimed at 
guaranteeing the continuity of the banking business and at mitigating as much as 
possible the possible losses derived from the situation. 
In conclusion, as results of the statistical analysis we have the following: 
A. The model is significant as a whole. The Chi-Square test yields a p-value less 
than 0.05. 
B. The parameters estimated individually are generally significant with a value less 
than 0.05. 
C. The adjustment quality measures are all close to 1. The RMSEA has a value of 
0.062, and the CFI of 0.914. This makes our data well explained by the proposed 
model. 
With these data, we can affirm that the hypothesis that we proposed in the methodology 
section is fulfilled. The new solvency regulations and the new capital requirements 
imposed on banks have helped to improve the situation of declining entities' 
profitability. It has not been possible to recover the levels of profitability prior to 2008, 
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Reglamento (UE) 575/2013, de 26 de junio de 2013 , sobre los requisitos prudenciales 
de las entidades de crédito y las empresas de inversión, y por el que se modifica el 
Reglamento (UE) N. ° 648/2012. 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1: Recent mergers of the different Spanish banking entities. 


Source: Expansion Daily. https://www.expansion.com/empresas/banca/
2019/03/21/5c92ae78e5fdeab4668b4625.html
Annex 2: Basel III implementation schedule. 
Compromisos en curso (las zonas sombreadas son periodos de transición; todas las fechas comienzan a 1 de Enero)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Ratio de apalancamiento (1) Control de los supervisores Ejecución en paralelo (3% Tier 1) de 1 de Enero de 2013 a 1 de Enero de 2017. 
Divulgación comienza 1 de Enero de 2015.
Ajuste final Migración al Pilar 1 -
Ratio mínimo de capital 
ordinario (2)
- - 3.50 % 4.00 % 4.50 % 4.50 % 4.50 % 4.50 % 4.50 %
Colchón de conservación (3) - - - - - 0.625 % 1.25 % 1.875 % 2.50 %
(2) + (3) = (4) - - 3.50 % 4.00 % 4.50 % 5.125 % 5.75 % 6.375 % 7.00 %
Deducciones transitorias sobre 
el CET 1 (5)
- - - 20.00 % 40.00 % 60.00 % 80.00 % 100.00 % 100.00 %
Tier 1 Capital (6) - - 4.50 % 5.50 % 6.00 % 6.00 % 6.00 % 6.00 % 6.00 %
Ratio Capital Total (7) - - 8.00 % 8.00 % 8.00 % 8.00 % 8.00 % 8.00 % 8.00 %
(7) + (3) = (8) - - 8.00 % 8.00 % 8.00 % 8.625 % 9.25 % 9.875 % 10.50 %
Elementos no válidos para 
incluirlos en Tier 1 o Tier 2
- - Retirados de forma paulatina en un horizonte temporal de 10 años, comenzando en 2013.
Coeficiente de cobertura de 




- - - Se introduce el 
estándar mínimo
- - - -
Coeficiente de financiación 
estable neta
- Comienza el 
periodo de 
observación
- - - - - Se introduce el 
estándar mínimo
-
Source: Millám, J.R. (2017). Análisis de la evolución de la solvencia y de la rentabilidad de las entidades de depósito españolas 
Annex 3: Consolidated assets of Spanish deposit institutions (2008-2019). 
ACTIVO 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
CRÉDITOS 2208872743 2329235078 2284463351 2268404055 2224230435 2090466054 1808428718 1700261573 1676013301 1632263358 1680260216 1642428872 1659409374
Sistema crediticio 229823701 239046544 215657096 188441535 199244887 229550279 165059869 113516149 135626425 141412542 214793432 196986723 178199615
AAPP 38755249 47688165 61227692 74491997 82989189 96890356 76626614 94697014 85708582 83866560 74339530 65739894 63785565
OSR 1691933135 1795108548 1776532628 1782291283 1715036540 1537748013 1392383771 1328188686 1274652552 1222510780 1199106319 1150227684 1135589579






256938573 314367735 405460816 377801449 397306864 489462384 464360068 469853782 398320348 352261168 318530468 315504407 307576732
Residentes en España 176056951 232077185 311923327 313915760 338966696 406653886 389590970 388415052 323717990 280504630 247449970 233589016 219685642
Residentes en el 




183388969 171658815 183818902 180188964 250540167 257153693 279997521 261043953 245516660 243047221 258418505 235466684 250035912
Residentes en España 101607778 91990252 99198603 102877982 160409176 166986497 188717990 156946579 133401336 129552238 145383054 126228845 131335186
Sector Exterior 81781191 79668563 84620299 77310982 90130991 90167196 91279531 104097374 112115324 113494983 113035451 109237839 118700726
OTROS NO 
SECTORIZADOS 187629349 280994286 249090509 292862123 378148063 419303812 321389991 347969772 325642016 313559802 292654914 282948369 300876968
Efectivo 8541647 9006968 8517102 7882548 7486153 7433738 7280030 7604037 7957872 7469389 8071726 8654754 9315633
Otros 179087702 271987318 240573407 284979575 370661910 411870074 314109961 340365735 317684144 306090413 284583188 274293615 291561335
TOTAL ACTIVO 2836829634 3096255914 3122833578 3119256591 3250225529 3256385943 2874176298 2779129080 2645492325 2541131549 2549864103 2476348332 2517898986
Source: Boletín Estadístico del Banco de España.
Annex 4: Liabilities and Consolidated net equity of Spanish deposit institutions (2008-2019). 
PASIVO Y PN 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
DEPÓSITOS 2046684600 2262196394 2267890615 2244624468 2245317169 2224677498 1999035737 1938813406 1887280517 1806954181 1805740472 1773708831 1787099432
Sistema 
crediticio 222760416 265744281 270897221 236123047 340065731 524074376 333422041 276373477 274080774 256567319 293383380 251850367 214414505
AAPP y 
Dotaciones 74470976 75057760 77873472 75287050 66470059 67341464 61796163 73448988 76097156 53441195 60910483 70862506 68816882
OSR 1319390781 1428936047 1422781151 1434103776 1358356390 1304172269 1307975514 1283799281 1255068129 1234175905 1193835580 1203245591 1252423294










199177480 232757752 259750277 269888252 350125924 389230211 414009790 392410266 353534122 345286544 346869395 314267023 311078471





192057582 242289597 201088429 224072203 283140425 315982676 224553223 251485197 220408672 214118934 196857668 181503471 192717340
TOTAL 
PASIVO Y PN 2836829582 3096255098 3122834152 3119257058 3250225749 3256385942 2874176306 2779129112 2645492331 2541131558 2549864103 2476348812 2517903626
Source: Boletín Estadístico del Banco de España-
Annex 5: Consolidated P&G account of Spanish deposit institutions (2008-2019). 
CUENTA DE 
RESULTADOS 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Productos 
financieros 113599765 141653582 103088812 77091165 83962904 80464525 65027621 54733574 43462892 36234000 32976000 32647000 32950000
Costes 
Financieros 81458355 106495695 60054197 42798951 54398120 47725067 38211797 27616046 17052142 11937000 9798000 9370000 9801000
Margen de 
intereses 32141410 35157887 43034615 34292214 29564784 32739458 26815824 27117528 26410750 24297000 23178000 23277000 23149000
Rto. Inst. cap. Y 
otros ptos. Y 
gtos.
32977549 31224201 24517059 29020664 27560852 26767975 28728107 28300061 25121253 24132000 23467000 24499000 26238000
Margen bruto 65118959 66382088 67551674 63312878 57125636 59507433 55543931 55417589 51532003 48429000 46646000 47777000 49387000
Gastos de 




17086805 17901334 17742200 17642567 16889388 15586920 15108343 14328646 14181977 13943000 13931000 13648000 13874000





8029270 15245052 19551323 16718935 22668057 82547485 21799915 14499828 10697927 8344000 9105000 3140000 3963000
Rdo. De 
explotación 27568797 18224761 17249423 13199699 4189110 -56412772 4760963 12932735 12806835 10202000 7294000 16460000 16438000
Pérd. Det. Resto 
de activos 1232835 947767 7494074 5290339 21738130 33444028 4109818 1528482 3414162 3968000 9286000 2189000 2026000
Otros rdos. 2983446 3112089 4611212 1927240 112790 2723650 3505291 1659114 1361640 458000 1318000 137000 717000
BAI 29319408 20389083 14366561 9836600 -17436230 -87133150 4156436 13063367 10754313 6691000 -674000 14408000 15128000
IS 4118036 1903006 1365014 133823 -2743076 -13441420 -4658407 1677930 1396573 643000 3227000 1985000 1255000
Dot. OBS 89373 64768 45478 30049 24207 14304 25196 42331 45354 45000 56000 66000 73000
Bº contable 25111999 18421309 12956069 9672728 -14717361 -73706034 8789647 11343106 9312386 6003000 -3957000 12356000 13800000
Source: Boletín Estadístico del Banco de España-
Annex 6: Ratios used in the practical application of structural equation models. 
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 X1 X2 X3 X4
2007 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2008 0.62773346 1.19537898 1.09522165 1.07068157 0.99466235 1.07642716 0.73356601 0.67210265 0.96086907 1.09385018
2009 0.39561813 1.04513948 0.94942063 1.18467766 0.98605462 1.20143209 0.51593141 0.46867996 0.78212755 1.33891497
2010 0.28426536 1.42535926 1.2963029 1.23232682 0.98245645 1.25433227 0.38518351 0.35030783 0.98257144 1.06691691
2011 -0.3333993 2.63431953 2.29926066 1.53427706 0.95965514 1.59877961 -0.5860689 -0.5115268 1.10222679 0.91983469
2012 -1.5019499 4.0202874 3.5023092 1.70240816 0.94695895 1.79776342 -2.9350923 -2.5569318 0.94244861 1.01860678
2013 0.16839135 4.32888138 4.27263247 2.05158837 0.92059125 2.22855516 0.35001781 0.34546973 1.14411083 0.83430764
2014 0.22927177 4.49050437 4.58373667 2.01105831 0.92365181 2.1772905 0.45170064 0.46107889 1.10256272 0.84369441
2015 0.20892412 3.27855734 3.51568157 1.90334648 0.93178546 2.04268746 0.37083412 0.39765499 1.13837857 0.82170477
2016 0.13789472 3.25539589 3.63420915 1.93528766 0.92937348 2.0823573 0.23904907 0.26686595 1.24338941 0.7559407
2017 -0.0904813 2.94206819 3.27317296 1.93750115 0.92920633 2.08511402 -0.1575741 -0.1753077 1.3151249 0.7211258
2018 0.31184446 2.71710341 3.11263136 1.80750746 0.93902278 1.92488138 0.4920357 0.56366119 1.27829949 0.72420594
2019 0.35185853 2.62964215 2.96272679 1.75964344 0.94263892 1.86672055 0.54953809 0.61914555 1.30203447 0.72022354
Source: own elaboration.
Annex 7: R code that implements the SEM model in its Path analysis modality. 
X1=c(1.0000000, 
     0.6277335, 
     0.3956181, 
     0.2842654, 
     -0.3333993, 
     -1.5019499, 
     0.1683913, 
     0.2292718, 
     0.2089241, 
     0.1378947, 
     -0.0904813, 
     0.3118445, 
     0.3518585) 
X2=c(1.0000000, 
     1.1953790, 
     1.0451395, 
     1.4253593, 
     2.6343195, 
     4.0202874, 
     4.3288814, 
     4.4905044, 
     3.2785573, 
     3.2553959, 
     2.9420682, 
     2.7171034, 
     2.6296422) 
X3=c(1.0000000, 
     1.0706816, 
     1.1846777, 
     1.2323268, 
     1.5342771, 
     1.7024082, 
     2.0515884, 
     2.0110583, 
     1.9033465, 
     1.9352877, 
     1.9375012, 
     1.8075075, 
     1.7596434) 
X4=c(1.0000000, 
     0.9946623, 
     0.9860546, 
     0.9824564, 
     0.9596551, 
     0.9469590, 
     0.9205912, 
     0.9236518, 
     0.9317855, 
     0.9293735, 
     0.9292063, 
     0.9390228, 
     0.9426389) 
X5=c(1.0000000, 
     1.0764272, 
     1.2014321, 
     1.2543323, 
     1.5987796, 
     1.7977634, 
     2.2285552, 
     2.1772905, 
     2.0426875, 
     2.0823573, 
     2.0851140, 
     1.9248814, 
     1.8667206) 
Y1=c(1.0000000, 
     0.7335660, 
     0.5159314, 
     0.3851835, 
     -0.5860689, 
     -2.9350923, 
     0.3500178, 
     0.4517006, 
     0.3708341, 
     0.2390491, 
     -0.1575741, 
     0.4920357, 
     0.5495381) 
Y2=c(1.0000000, 
     0.6721027, 
     0.4686800, 
     0.3503078, 
     -0.5115268, 
     -2.5569318, 
     0.3454697, 
     0.4610789, 
     0.3976550, 
     0.2668660, 
     -0.1753077, 
     0.5636612, 
     0.6191455) 
Y3=c(1.0000000, 
     0.9608691, 
     0.7821275, 
     0.9825714, 
     1.1022268, 
     0.9424486, 
     1.1441108, 
     1.1025627, 
     1.1383786, 
     1.2433894, 
     1.3151249, 
     1.2782995, 
     1.3020345) 
Y4=c(1.0000000, 
     1.0938502, 
     1.3389150, 
     1.0669169, 
     0.9198347, 
     1.0186068, 
     0.8343076, 
     0.8436944, 
     0.8217048, 
     0.7559407, 
     0.7211258, 
     0.7242059, 











            X2, 
            X3, 
            X4, 
            X5, 
            Y1, 
            Y2, 
            Y3, 


























Annex 8: Correlation Matrix. 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4
X1 1.00 -0.56 -0.38 0.38 -0.37 0.98 0.98 0.03 0.06
X2 -0.56 1.00 0.91 -0.91 0.91 -0.43 -0.43 0.45 -0.60
X3 -0.38 0.91 1.00 -1.00 1.00 -0.22 -0.21 0.70 -0.78
X4 0.38 -0.91 -1.00 1.00 -1.00 0.22 0.21 -0.70 0.78
X5 -0.37 0.91 1.00 -1.00 1.00 -0.20 -0.20 0.70 -0.78
Y1 0.98 -0.43 -0.22 0.22 -0.20 1.00 1.00 0.15 -0.05
Y2 0.98 -0.43 -0.21 0.21 -0.20 1.00 1.00 0.16 -0.07
Y3 0.03 0.45 0.70 -0.70 0.70 0.15 0.16 1.00 -0.97
Y4 0.06 -0.60 -0.78 0.78 -0.78 -0.05 -0.07 -0.97 1.00
Source: own elaboration

